ENGINEERING

INVERSE

How did Anglo-American intelligence and its partners learn during the occupation of Iraq to create hoaxes like ISIS?

 

By Dany Smith

It is known that in the military field this concept is applied to the analysis of the operation of a certain mechanism with the intention of copying it. Thus, after capturing pieces or devices of the enemy, engineers seek to unravel how it has been built to see if it is possible to reproduce it and in many cases, look for weaknesses to manufacture a countermeasure.

But this concept is also used to copy or rather we should say, “imitate” actions, behaviors and procedures of a given human activity. As far as war is concerned, this is the responsibility of the intelligence agencies that begin their task from discursive details such as semiotic intoxication (insurgency by resistance) to creating monstrosities such as blowing up a mosque full of worshippers.

It was precisely the Anglo-American invasion of Iraq in March 2003 that set the stage for a dynamic that the Bush-Cheney administration clumsily and hastily thought it had mastered by simply announcing the “end of combat actions”.

From the White House to the Pentagon and from there to Langley, the underestimation of the Iraqis was amplified by the media corporation. This optimism was based on the brutal bombing that they called “Op. Shock and Awe” which killed thousands of citizens without distinguishing between Sunnis, Shiites, Christians and Kurds without forgetting that it was all based on lies.

The Iraqis, despite not being militarily up to the task of facing a modern force assisted by satellite technology, eventually taught their invaders a hard lesson and they (beyond the losses they had to bear) ended up exploiting that painful experience.

The organization of the “Moqawamma” (resistance) was not a product of improvisation or desperation. The Iraqi Mukhabarat had prepared several reports between 1991 and 2002 that were intended for Saddam Hussein and Ibrahim Al Duri, the visible and influential heads of the party. They detailed how to structure a strategy to face what would happen in March 2003, what should be the tactics to be developed (many of them executed before they entered Baghdad) if the enemy penetrated the territory and a detailed chronogram of the structure that the resistance should acquire.

Beyond what was never said by the media, especially CNN and BBC, the misnamed “insurgency” was a tactical success that was about to collapse the occupation troops individually creating in each recruit and officer the real feeling of not being safe even in their Hummers. Paul Bremer and the rest of the bastards of the Interim Administration realized that their asses were not safe, even though they were protected in the Green Zone.

So military intelligence was commissioned to cooperate with the CIA (very hard for both) in order to find ways to counteract the Moqawamma, which by 2004 had become a difficult phenomenon to control and was screwing up the Washington DC narrative.

At the same time, the CIA (using its contacts with its British colleagues linked to the Muslim Brotherhood) had infiltrated some shenanigans (groups) with mercenaries led by Saudi, Jordanian and Qatari agents that did not succeed, proving that the Iraqis were smarter than their dirty tricks. But the placement of an agent they had already used in Afghanistan named Abu Muzab Al Zarqawi was central to the creation of the “Al Qaeda-Iraq” cell, a subterfuge (born out of the original program) that the CIA shared with the military to try to discredit the resistance.

Zarqawi and his people were coordinated with the occupation and their favorite targets were civilians, mosques and the collaborationist police forces without ever touching the Americans or the British, a detail that would later be impossible to cover up. As the hoax that he was, they had freedom of movement within Baghdad and that was how many attacks, assassinations and kidnappings could be carried out undetected but which CNN and its repeaters would blame on the national resistance.

Zarqawi began to gather information, to copy the methodology of the Iraqi mujahideen and to imitate some tactics to ambush convoys of the puppet government. They even (and with the help of the NSA) had their web sites which, unlike those of the real resistance, were maintained without problems. But to confuse and generate terror in everyday life, imitation in the use of certain tactics was critical. One of the tactics they duplicated on many occasions was the arming of vehicle bombs, but unlike the resistance, they were launched against civilian targets with a Shiite predilection.

This was quickly noticed by Iraqi citizens but, fear, caution and the information isolation to which they were subjected by the invaders left room for CNN to fabricate culprits at will.

Zarqawi was -very conveniently- eliminated by his employers in 2006 because he was no longer useful. Even the CIA quietly tried to remove him from the scene and when they failed and left him to the military. His spectacular removal was to improve the US and Bush's electoral image in that year's elections. By that time General David Petraeus in charge of US military intelligence, with all the information gathered and the assets that had been recruited (including former Baath officers), further strengthened counter intelligence by creating new fake groups among which would later stand out, the Islamic State of Iraq (ISIS) prototype of the ISIS of 2014 that sought to emulate the “Islamic Army of Iraq” (of the Iraqi resistance) that was spreading its operations in an alarming way.

From then on, the intelligence work to examine procedures, imitate them and perfect the tactics of the resistance were constant and since then part of an intensive study in the academies that, as we have already seen, are used by the impostors who today under the label of “Jihadists” try to fulfill the strategic plans of the West.