FORCES OF THE SKY AND THE GEOPOLITICS OF REALITY

24 old American fighter planes Are they a real threat to Britain or... an advantage?

 

By Sir Charlattam

I was aware that the Argentine armed forces were in dire straits; this was nothing new to me, and even less so to the Foreign Office in London. Since the end of the South Atlantic War in June 1982, all Downing Street administrations have maintained a consistent policy towards this country: ‘Do not allow it to rearm.’ As part of this plan, since 1983, intelligence services have reinforced and improved their networks of informants and operators in the media and political and military circles at the intergovernmental level in the capital, who would ensure that any initiative for nationalist revival would be torpedoed.

For forty-two years, this, combined with a continuous public relations campaign, succeeded in ensuring that internal political contradictions, fuelled by abrasive sectors antagonistic to the institutionality of the army, hindered its most basic operational tasks. The use of human rights as a political tool was a tactic inspired by MI6 and other European agencies to some of the organisations representing the disappeared, and then extended this by resorting to emotional manipulation (part of psychological warfare), with the disinterested ‘humanitarian initiative’ of Army Colonel Geoffrey Cardozo to identify the bodies of Argentine soldiers in Darwin.

The purchase of 24 Danish (very oldies) F-16 aircraft may be seen by Argentines as progress for a sector abandoned by political apathy and corruption, but in reality it is as if they had acquired nothing.

This was expected in London, as official and unofficial diplomatic channels between the Pentagon and the Joint Chiefs of Staff are fluid. When it became known that Donald Trump had endorsed the acquisition and instructed Denmark to facilitate the Milei government's negotiations, Starmer and the intelligence community were not amused and tried to get the Americans to reconsider. And while they were doing so, the military intelligence (DMI) boys were planning their own party. Even MI6 was not absent and closely followed the negotiations to Skrydstrup Air Base, where the aircraft were located. A plan was proposed to sabotage the aircraft using a cell that would infiltrate the base. To this end, the saboteurs would stay in a house in a village to the south in Over Jerstal, an initiative that was ruled out after the CIA warned against interference.

The move was not timed well, given the strained relations between London and Washington DC, which have been severely damaged by disagreements over the war in Ukraine and the fate of agent Zelensky. I cannot blame these colleagues, or even Starmer himself, for this attempt. We are practical people and we will seek a solution wherever it may be found. This is only natural, as it reflects a deeply ingrained way of thinking and acting within the British intelligence community.

It was to be expected that both Conservatives and Labour would not hesitate on this point. What they have never agreed on is why we should be in those islands when they cost the treasury billions of pounds a year. The Conservatives are the ones who maintain their unquestionable stance of protecting the United Kingdom's overseas territories, but even they know that this term is anachronistic and does not fit with the legal situation of the Falklands. Of course, this is all nonsense, and today it is public knowledge that the real interests of the elite lie in controlling the entire maritime platform of the islands and Patagonia, which is rich in polymetallic nodules and has large reserves of oil and gas underneath.

Accompanying this is all the maritime wealth and commercial fishing that is managed and profited from by the Kelper government, which in turn pays rent to London for maintaining its forces on the islands.

Once again, we have to talk about business, both private and related to defence and the arms industry, in which politicians and CEOs cut the cake, and the South Atlantic islands have always been, like any other scenario, an excuse for this. But the great trophy in this region is control over access to and exploitation of the Antarctic territory, which covers an area similar to that of Argentina and Chile combined. 

As for the F-16s that were presented to the public with such fanfare and which the Milei government is touting as a medal, let me tell you that they would pose no threat to Port Stanley or any ship sailing in Argentine waters. Do you know why? First, because it is NATO equipment and the RAF is familiar with it. Second, because the Americans have already provided London with a detailed information catalogue and the history of each aircraft, revealing their capabilities and vulnerabilities. It's as simple as that. In conclusion, this turns the Argentines into a second-rate pro-Atlanticist reserve that complements NATO's weapons in Port Stanley.

It is from there that the sudden change in the policy of restrictions on the Argentine armed forces would allow the Milei government to re-equip itself with British material, something very unusual. What does London expect in return? There may be a connection with the dangerous geopolitical reality in which Europe, and Great Britain in particular, find themselves involved in Ukraine. In this regard, the signs of preparations for a war against the Russian Federation and the global south should be taken very seriously by Argentine politicians so as not to become involved in something they never expected.

To summarise the above and in terms of strategic power, these F-16s mean nothing to London. From a material point of view, for a scrapped and unmotivated armed forces, they are new toys, even if they have decades of use behind them. In a broader sense, they are a second-rate addition to NATO. Furthermore, London is aware that the cyclical changes in Argentine governments can cause unexpected surprises, but at the same time there seems to be a willingness to give Buenos Aires some credit to rearm its defence, not because it is good for the Argentines, but for some reason and to some extent in favour of Great Britain.