A RUINED MAJESTY

Rumours of the Royal Navy’s dire straits at such a critical juncture, is the situation really as bad as reported, or is this simply a ploy to justify budget demands?

 

By Sir Charlattam

For a long time now, venturing aboard a Royal Navy destroyer has been just that: an adventure. This remark was made to me by an old friend and surviving crew member of HMS ‘Sir Galahad’, which was sunk in the South Atlantic during the Falklands War. He is no longer with us, but he lives on like a ghost amidst the loud rumours about the current, dire state of Her Majesty’s fleet.

Just as US President Donald Trump and his security advisers (with Israel’s involvement) are planning to launch a new offensive against Iran, the British navy’s dirty laundry is being aired, revealing that we have hit rock bottom and, worse still, without anyone having even touched us.

Apparently, and according to public reports, the downsizing of the Royal Navy reveals a critical state of affairs, with only two destroyers in service, each costing 1 billion pounds, and four Type 23 frigates  the same model that London once sold to our friends in Chile to support naval operations coordinated from Port Stanley, amongst other tasks, namely to contain Argentine naval operations in the South Atlantic, and which have on several occasions complained of hull problems.

If we consider this view, Britain finds itself in a very precarious situation at a time when there is a likelihood of an escalation involving strategic nuclear weapons, including those deployed at sea. In short, the Royal Navy is not in a position to wage war effectively without the risk of being destroyed in the first engagement, a highly probable risk if it exposes itself in the Gulf of Oman to Iranian anti-ship missiles.

The current situation facing the Royal Navy is a matter of perspective, as for some it is an exaggeration driven by the political interests of factions disillusioned with Prime Minister Keir Starmer and the management of his Defence Secretary, John Healey, as a way of drawing MPs’ attention to the needs of such an important and strategic branch of the armed forces. For others, it is the continuation of a state of decline that has persisted for over a decade, with no attention paid not only to modernising the Type 23 frigates but also to repairing them to prevent them from being left adrift on the high seas.

Apparently, the situation is so dire that there are rumours that cadet intake numbers at military academies such as the Britannia Royal Naval College and the Royal Naval College, Torpoint, in Cornwall, could begin to be reduced. This is neither an exaggeration nor something that is happening only now; do you remember the situation with HMS Westminster? I think it would be an exaggeration to say that this marks the end of the something along those lines, but given how complex the situation is, I can’t help but say: Funny bussines!  

The criticisms that have emerged centre on the lack of, or insufficient, budgetary provision to maintain what remains of what was once the world’s most important fleet; of course, that was a long time ago, and even longer since the delusional proposal to resurrect the old glories of the British Empire through the Brexit of the far-from-comical clown Johnson and his partner Ben Wallace.

On this point, let us say that problems with naval vessels are nothing new. Setting aside the disciplinary issues and scandals that have come to light in some cases, the available navigation equipment is in a deplorable state, and governments have allowed this to go unchecked. According to a reliable source, if an inspection were to be carried out tomorrow on every vessel currently in service or moored in port and perhaps particularly at the Frigate Support Centre in Devonport the findings regarding all manner of shortcomings would trigger an even bigger scandal. Failing to maintain a reserve vessel moored without the budget or personnel to deploy it results in material deterioration that ultimately costs as much, if not more, than damage sustained in combat. From deficiencies in the electrical system and faults in the fire-control radar software to hull cracks caused by the impact of the waves, long-range operations have become veritable odysseys where improvisation as if they were naval units from a banana republic is worth more than the stripes of a captain with delusions of being an admiral.

Complaints about the general state of affairs begin with a significant reduction in the number of ships and submarines in operation, compounded by the fact that a large proportion of these vessels show signs of material fatigue, endangering the crews and the integrity of the vessels themselves. If we add to these shortcomings the meagre and delayed production of new Type 26 and Type 31 frigates, and with it the inactivity of the shipyards (this applies to British vessels) compared to the productivity and availability enjoyed by rival navies such as those of China and the Russian Federation, it becomes clear that disproportion that is not even offset by greater sophistication.

It is clear, gentlemen, that the private business deals and contracts between private companies and other nations which have been managed and from which the politicians in power have benefited carry more weight than the very defence of Britain’s interests. Whilst we know that lucrative contracts have been signed –for both London and Canberra– for the delivery of new AUKUS submarines to Australia in 2030, our own submarine fleet is also going through a difficult period in terms of maintenance and lack of funding. If anyone has any doubts about the latter, the Director of Submarines should be asked to report to Parliament in great detail.