A RUINED MAJESTY
Rumours of the Royal Navy’s dire straits at such a
critical juncture, is the situation really as bad as reported, or is this
simply a ploy to justify budget demands?
By Sir Charlattam
For a long time now, venturing aboard a Royal Navy destroyer has been just that: an adventure. This remark was made to me by an old friend and surviving crew member of HMS ‘Sir Galahad’, which was sunk in the South Atlantic during the Falklands War. He is no longer with us, but he lives on like a ghost amidst the loud rumours about the current, dire state of Her Majesty’s fleet.
Just as US President Donald Trump and his security
advisers (with Israel’s involvement) are planning to launch a new offensive against
Iran, the British navy’s dirty laundry is being aired, revealing that we have
hit rock bottom and, worse still, without anyone having even touched us.
Apparently, and according to public reports, the
downsizing of the Royal Navy reveals a critical state of affairs, with only two
destroyers in service, each costing 1 billion pounds, and four Type 23
frigates the same model that London once
sold to our friends in Chile to support naval operations coordinated from Port
Stanley, amongst other tasks, namely to contain Argentine naval operations in
the South Atlantic, and which have on several occasions complained of hull
problems.
If we consider this view, Britain finds itself in a
very precarious situation at a time when there is a likelihood of an escalation
involving strategic nuclear weapons, including those deployed at sea. In short,
the Royal Navy is not in a position to wage war effectively without the risk of
being destroyed in the first engagement, a highly probable risk if it exposes
itself in the Gulf of Oman to Iranian anti-ship missiles.
The current situation facing the Royal Navy is a
matter of perspective, as for some it is an exaggeration driven by the
political interests of factions disillusioned with Prime Minister Keir Starmer
and the management of his Defence Secretary, John Healey, as a way of drawing
MPs’ attention to the needs of such an important and strategic branch of the
armed forces. For others, it is the continuation of a state of decline that has
persisted for over a decade, with no attention paid not only to modernising the
Type 23 frigates but also to repairing them to prevent them from being left
adrift on the high seas.
Apparently, the situation is so dire that there are
rumours that cadet intake numbers at military academies such as the Britannia
Royal Naval College and the Royal Naval College, Torpoint, in Cornwall, could
begin to be reduced. This is neither an exaggeration nor something that is
happening only now; do you remember the situation with HMS Westminster? I think
it would be an exaggeration to say that this marks the end of the something
along those lines, but given how complex the situation is, I can’t help but
say: Funny bussines!
The criticisms that have emerged centre on the lack
of, or insufficient, budgetary provision to maintain what remains of what was
once the world’s most important fleet; of course, that was a long time ago, and
even longer since the delusional proposal to resurrect the old glories of the
British Empire through the Brexit of the far-from-comical clown Johnson and his
partner Ben Wallace.
On this point, let us say that problems with naval
vessels are nothing new. Setting aside the disciplinary issues and scandals
that have come to light in some cases, the available navigation equipment is in
a deplorable state, and governments have allowed this to go unchecked. According
to a reliable source, if an inspection were to be carried out tomorrow on every
vessel currently in service or moored in port and perhaps particularly at the
Frigate Support Centre in Devonport the findings regarding all manner of
shortcomings would trigger an even bigger scandal. Failing to maintain a
reserve vessel moored without the budget or personnel to deploy it results in
material deterioration that ultimately costs as much, if not more, than damage
sustained in combat. From deficiencies in the electrical system and faults in
the fire-control radar software to hull cracks caused by the impact of the
waves, long-range operations have become veritable odysseys where improvisation
as if they were naval units from a banana republic is worth more than the
stripes of a captain with delusions of being an admiral.
Complaints about the general state of affairs begin
with a significant reduction in the number of ships and submarines in
operation, compounded by the fact that a large proportion of these vessels show
signs of material fatigue, endangering the crews and the integrity of the
vessels themselves. If we add to these shortcomings the meagre and delayed
production of new Type 26 and Type 31 frigates, and with it the inactivity of
the shipyards (this applies to British vessels) compared to the productivity
and availability enjoyed by rival navies such as those of China and the Russian
Federation, it becomes clear that disproportion that is not even offset by
greater sophistication.
It is clear, gentlemen, that the private business
deals and contracts between private companies and other nations which have been
managed and from which the politicians in power have benefited carry more
weight than the very defence of Britain’s interests. Whilst we know that
lucrative contracts have been signed –for both London and Canberra– for
the delivery of new AUKUS submarines to Australia in 2030, our own submarine
fleet is also going through a difficult period in terms of maintenance and lack
of funding. If anyone has any doubts about the latter, the Director of
Submarines should be asked to report to Parliament in great detail.
